Due to the disconnected and store-and-forward architecture in multimedia social networks (MSNs), routing becomes a great challenge with the frequent path disruptions. Moreover, some nodes in MSNs tend to be selfish or malicious, e.g. they sometimes will not forward packets for other nodes or will launch passive and active attacks in order to save their limited resources such as bandwidth, battery or storage. In order to address this issue, we propose a fuzzy-based trust management technique for context-based routing in MSNs. We incorporate social trust metrics and quality of service metrics into our trust model. By adopting fuzzy sets, every node can evaluate the credibility of other nodes based on the direct and indirect relationship. By ranking all its neighbors according to the trust values, each node can purge untrustworthy nodes. Since only trusted nodes' packets will be forwarded, the selfish or malicious nodes have the incentive to behave well again in order to be able to send packets. Additionally, we perform extensive security and performance evaluation with the opportunistic network environment simulator. The simulation results show that our trust model can dynamically update the trust value in real time, effectively measure the trust relationship and correctly identify malicious or selfish nodes. Furthermore, the proposed trust routing is a lightweight protocol balancing the message overhead and delivery ratio.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of network socialization has led to the emergence of different services and functions provided by multimedia social networks (MSNs). These MSNs offer network services, and copyrighted digital contents (e.g. images and videos) that are shared among nodes within social networks anytime and anywhere [1] . More portable and affordable mobile devices have made MSNs rather popular. In such networks, people move around and contact others based on their social connections such as workplace, friendship and interest [2] . MSNs demonstrate several unique features: dynamic topology, high mobility, episodic connectivity and a store-and-forward architecture. Due to the frequent path disruptions, routing for MSNs has become a great challenge.
Epidemic [3] has been proposed as a routing approach in sparse and/or highly mobile networks. Epidemic routing is able to achieve minimum delivery delay at the expense of consuming more resources such as buffer space, bandwidth and transmission power. More recently, context-based routing schemes have been proposed for the opportunistic networks and have been demonstrated to be more efficient and accurate [4, 5] . Context information represents user behavior and interaction history such as current working environment, locations and prior rendezvous with other nodes. 1 Such information can be used to help with forwarder selection.
Selfish and malicious nodes in MSNs cause another challenge in the routing. Routing in MSNs relies on cooperation among participating nodes. However, cooperative forwarding incurs costs to forwarding nodes, both in terms of battery power and storage, which are usually constrained in mobile devices. Hence, selfish nodes may refuse to forward messages for other nodes, counteracting the cooperative effort for the entire network. Additionally, malicious attackers may launch deny of service (DoS) attacks based on flooding, consuming limited caches as well as communication bandwidth. Thus, an efficient routing protocol must be able to 2 G. Wu et al. protect itself from selfish and malicious attacks. Unfortunately, such a problem has either been ignored [4] [5] [6] or addressed by a technique that requires a centralized unit or a trusted thirdparty [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
In this paper, we propose a trust routing scheme to create incentives and stimulate the cooperation among nodes. Every node forwards messages based on its trust relationship with others. In our trust model, a node's credibility is computed by combining social trust measurements with some quality of service (QoS) requirements. Social trust measurements include the probability of successful interactions and the feedback of digital content. QoS trust measurements refer to context matching ratio and energy. In this paper, fuzzy sets are used to evaluate the trustworthiness with imprecise information in a non-probabilistic environment. By ranking all neighbors based on their trust values, each node only forwards packets to those with higher trust values.
Our contributions of this work are as follows.
(i) Different from other works [13, 14] [6, 9, 15] . (iii) We further design a recovery and mobile firewall mechanism to prevent the spread of viral content and balance the energy consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce fuzzy sets and context-based routing. In Section 3, we provide a brief introduction to the network model, attack model and some security requirements. We present the details of our proposed scheme in Section 4. The simulation results are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we describe the related work. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce fuzzy sets and contextbased routing.
Fuzzy sets
Different from the classical set theory in which the membership of elements is assessed in binary terms: an element either belongs or does not belong to a set. A fuzzy set is defined by a membership function which maps the domain of interest into the interval [0, 1] . Let X be a space of points, X = {x}. A fuzzy set A is defined by a membership function f A (x), which associates each point in space X to a real number in [0, 1] and the value of f A (x) represents the grade of membership of x in the set A [16] . The closer the value is to 1, the higher the grade of membership is.
For a finite set U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m }, the membership vector is calculated:
Considering different vector elements may have different roles, we define {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i , . . . , w m } as the weight vector. Then, the final judgment value is calculated:
Similarly, f B (x) represents the grade of membership of x in the set B and its final value v B is calculated. Then, we define V = {v A , v B , . . . , v X } to represent the grade of membership of x. Based on the maximum degree of membership, each element in the set U belongs to the set v i = max(V ).
Fuzzy sets have been commonly used with imprecise information in a non-probabilistic sense, such as artificial intelligence and control engineering. Works in [17] [18] [19] adopt fuzzy sets to evaluate the trustworthiness and deal with the uncertain trust information coming from other nodes.
Context-based routing
In some mobile networks such as MSNs, it is sometimes difficult to establish a complete path from source to destination. Thus, the conventional wireless routing protocols cannot be applied. In order to improve network performance, routing protocols in MSNs need to achieve reliability even with frequent link disconnection. Flooding-based routing protocols can solve this problem, but only with excessive overhead and energy consumption. It is unsuitable for the portable devices with limited resources. Context information in these networks can be exploited to improve routing performance, by helping with routing decisions.
In this section, we briefly introduce an original design of an epidemic forwarding protocol where heuristic is based on the context (e.g. workplace, hobbies, personal information, etc.) [5] . The idea behind context-based routing protocol is that the chance of encounter is higher when two users share more social contexts.
We assume that there are N nodes. The context of a node n i is defined as a set of attributes A i j . Here A i j consists of an attribute name E i and its value V i j . E i is known by all nodes. As shown in Fig. 1 , there are four nodes and three attributes (E 1 = workplace, E 2 = status, E 3 = mail). When the source n s sends a message M to the destination n d , n s must first add some context information of n d into the message header. For example, when n 1 invites n 3 to join a party, n 1 will broadcast A Trust Routing for Multimedia Social Networks M with the payload 'Join us in the party tonight at 10 pm.' and the header message '(workplace, DLUT), (status, student), (mail, lili@dlut.com)'. When n 1 meets n 2 , n 1 will compute the matching ratio P = 2 3 , which shows that n 2 has more chances to meet n 3 . Then n 1 will forward M to n 2 ( Fig. 2) .
NETWORK MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we introduce the network model, attack model and some security requirements.
A. Network model
Our trust routing protocol uses several specific types of context information, on which a node credibility is evaluated. As shown in Fig. 3 , each node is given one profile to represent its identification and its context information [5] , such as '(workplace, DLUT), (mail, lili@dlut.com), (status, student)'. Based on different profiles, an MSN can be divided into multiple social cliques. When n s sends a message M to n d , n s will first add n d 's context information into its message header. Every encounter will compare this header with its own profile to decide whether to forward the message. Moreover, our scheme is based on the following assumptions [5, 8] :
(i) Every node uses omni-directional transceivers to monitor its neighbors in promiscuous mode. (ii) All links are bi-directional and all nodes have the same transmission range. A packet will be received/overheard by nodes within the transmission range.
B. Attack model
Usually, network attackers are categorized into passive and active ones. Obviously, active attackers are stronger than passive attackers. When nodes share and exchange multimedia content as well as other content, active attackers (malicious nodes) try to break the basic routing functionality by dropping packets, injecting faked data or malicious codes, etc. Passive attackers (selfish nodes) only try to save their limited resources by dropping packets.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the behavior of passive attackers (selfish nodes) with dropping packets.
C. Security requirements
In order to mitigate security threats, trust has been introduced from sociology to evaluate node credibility through sharing history and other potential behavior records [20] . A success trust relationship should be able to satisfy the following security requirements:
(i) A message carrier can distinguish selfish and normal nodes. It only forwards packets to normal nodes or trusted nodes but not to those selfish users.
(ii) An attacker can be distinguished by a normal node even though it does not have direct interaction with the normal node. (iii) After detecting selfish or malicious nodes, normal nodes punish them by refusing to forward messages from them. (iv) An attacker cannot share faked content with other nodes.
CONTEXT-BASED FUZZY TRUST ROUTING PROTOCOL
In this section, we will elaborate our context-based Fuzzy Trust routing protocol. The trust model is used to provide valuable trust evaluation of every entity and to facilitate safe and effective interaction among nodes. Nodes share and transmit digital content based on a certain trust relationship. In order to accurately evaluate trust relationship among nodes and choose the best forwarding nodes, our scheme has three stages: trust factor observation, trust calculation and routing decision, shown in Fig. 4 . Furthermore, we introduce the recovery and mobile firewall mechanism to prevent the spread of viral content. In Table 1 , the frequently used notations are listed. 
The probability of successful interactions between n i and n j P i j
The context matching ratio between n i and n j E i j
The energy of n j detected by n i Fed i j n i 's credible feedback of digital content on n j N s i j
The total number of packets that n i has sent to n j N f ji The total number of packets that n j has forwarded for n i RTA i→ j The trust similarity between n i and n j Prof(i)
The context information of n i V so i j n i 's social trust value on n j V fin i j n i 's final trust value on n j
Trust factor observation
We distinguish two kinds of trust decision factors: direct trust and indirect trust information. The direct trust information is generated from physical neighbors and the indirect trust information is derived from the recommendation of such neighbors. Direct trust relationship can be obtained from the evidence created by the physical interactions. The evaluating entity conducts a trust evaluation on the target entity based on its own experiences. For example, n i determines the trust level of n j solely based on n i 's direct experiences with n j (see Fig. 5 ).
In our system, we use fuzzy theory to describe the direct trust model.
Indirect trust relationship can be obtained from the propagation of direct trust information. In MSNs, it is unlikely for one node to share digital content with each of the nodes. Thus, recommended trust becomes the only means to evaluate nodes without direct interactions. For example, n i has a direct interaction with n j and n j has a direct interaction with n k . When n j forwards the direct trust value of n k to n i , n i can establish a new indirect trust relationship with n k based on these second-hand trust evidence.
To evaluate the trust relationship, we combine social and QoS metrics.
(i) Social trust: The probability of successful interactions and the credible feedback of digital content are used as the social trust metrics to judge whether the node is malicious or not. The probability of successful interactions: This probability is used to collect information about the packet forwarding behaviors of the neighbors [17] . Every node, such as n i , maintains two records for its neighbor n j , N s i j (the total number of packets sent from n i to n j ) and N f ji (the total number of packets forwarded for n i by n j ). The probability of successful interactions between n i and n j , Psi i j , evaluating whether n j is honest enough to forward packets for n i , can be calculated as follows:
Here λ is the penalty weight for the selfish node's behavior, with a bigger λ representing a higher penalty.
The credible feedback of digital content: In MSNs, digital content sharing is one of the most important functions. Once a node receives digital content, it can provide a feedback based on the safe credibility of the shared digital content. Thus, the creditable feedback of digital content Fed i j can be used as one social trust metric [12] . The value is in [0, 1], where 1 means that the shared digital content is deemed safe and 0 means the content is not credible or safe.
(ii) QoS trust: QoS trust is to evaluate the capability of delivering messages to the destination. The context matching ratio and energy are used to measure the QoS trust level.
The context matching ratio:
We assume that every node has a context profile. More shared context may provide more encounter chances. In our paper, the context matching ratio P d j is calculated in the following equation:
Here, Context d and Context j represent the context sets of N d and N j . To be more precise, we consider a network composed of a set of n nodes {n i } 1≤i≤n . Each node's context is defined as a set of attributes {A i, j } 1≤ j≤m .
Energy: Every node possesses limited battery power. It is a critical issue to use battery power efficiently. A node with more battery power can provide more services. Thus, the energy is also serving as a metric to calculate the trust value. We adopt the same method in [21] to detect a neighbor's energy.
Trust calculation
In this phase, we will introduce how to evaluate or compute the trust value of a target node. In addition to direct and indirect trust, we will discuss the comprehensive trust to balance the weight of direct and indirect decision factors. In Equation (5), we present the trust evaluation from n i to n j , T i→ j , where α and β represent the weights of social trust metrics S versus QoS trust metrics Q.
In order to determine the trust level range, a random consistency index, V = {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 }, is defined in Table 2 . The four elements in V represent 'full trust', 'relative trust', 
A. Direct trust
Based on the direct trust information from target entity, n i can store n j 's information in the following vector, where destination is the evaluated node. destination, Psi i j , Fed i j .
Based on the trust degree of each metric, n i can generate a matrix DT for every destination, where DT i j represents the membership degree from metric i to comprehensive evaluation level j.
B. Indirect trust
Indirect trust means that the evaluating entity indirectly obtains trust information for target entity based on the recommendation from a direct neighbor. However, even after two nodes have built the indirect trust relationship, a node with higher trust value cannot be simply treated as more reliable. This is due to the possibility of collusion attacks, in which the selfish nodes rank the trust values of other selfish nodes higher. To solve this problem, the similarity between two nodes must be used to evaluate the credibility of recommendation. The higher similarity between n i and n j is, the higher the credibility of recommendation is.
RT A i→ j is denoted as the trust similarity between n i and n j . In Equation (7), A and B represent the trust value sets from their common neighbors, where A(x k ) and B(x k ) are the set elements and z represents the number of their common neighbors.
ST i j is denoted as the indirect trust relationship. Considering that those nodes with lower recommended credibility may bring a negative impact on the final decision, we calculate the indirect relationship in Equation (8 
Then, n i may preserve the indirect trust information ST i j into a matrix I T as follows:
Here, I T i j represents the membership degree from metric i to comprehensive evaluation level j, either 'full trust', 'relative trust', 'general trust' or 'no trust'.
C. Comprehensive trust
In order to alleviate the influence from the subjective evaluation and obtain a more accurate trust value, our model combines direct and indirect trust values. First, the fuzzy evaluation matrix T is given as follows:
Here, ω dt represents the weight of the direct trust. Since the direct information is relatively important, we can increase the proportion of subjective judgment by increasing ω dt .
Then, we compute the comprehensive trust matrix S and obtain a set of membership values for different nodes as follows:
In Equation (11), the weight matrix W represents the weight ratio of different metrics with w psi + w fed = 1. W should be adjusted as w psi and w fed play different roles. In our scheme, we consider the equal weight, w psi = w fed = 0.5. T is a fuzzy matrix and t i j is the membership degree from metric i to comprehensive evaluation level j.
Finally, the trust value from n i to n j is evaluated in Equation (12), where u(v i ) represents the indices of the four trust levels in Table 2 . For example, if the final trust value is 3.1, the trust value belongs to v 2 , 'relatively trust'.
Trust ranking
Every node must rank its neighbors based on weighted average theory before it forwards or shares digital content further. There are two steps for trust ranking.
Step 1: First, every node must get the QoS trust information including C i j (connectivity between n i and n j ) and E i j (the battery power). Then, every node calculates the QoS trust according to the weight assigned to these metrics.
The trust value from n i to n j is represented in the following equation:
Here w qos and w social represent the weight parameter of QoS trust and social trust, respectively, with w qos + w social = 1. Social trust is used to decide whether the node is malicious or not, while QoS trust represents the capability of a node to forward messages. The weight parameters aim to balance the two trust metrics. And they can be adjusted in terms of different applications. In Section 5, we will analyze them.
Step 2: The sender ranks other nodes based on the trust value in Equation (14) . Only some of the more trusted neighbors will be chosen to forward or share the digital content. The percentage varies with different applications.
Recovery and mobile firewall mechanism
On one hand, the mobile firewall mechanism is adopted to prevent the spread of viral content. On the other hand, it also serves as an incentive to lure selfish nodes to return to normal behavior again and share multimedia information with others.
After calculation stage, if n i computes the trust value of n j to be non-trustworthy, it will broadcast the trust value to all of its neighbors, which will quickly rebroadcast the same message. If a node is detected to be selfish or malicious, it will receive no more messages from other nodes, wasting its stand-by energy. A timer can be set by n i to reset its trust value of n j . After the timer expires, n i can reset its evaluation of n j to 0.5, giving it a second chance. The timer for the next reset, if necessary, can be doubled.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Simulation configuration
In this section, we use the opportunistic network environment (ONE) simulator [6] to evaluate our trust routing. ONE serves as a powerful tool for generating mobility traces and running simulations with different routing protocols.
In our simulations, we adopt the shortest path map-based movement (SPMBM) model. Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm is to find its way through the map area of Helsinki in Fig. 6 . Once a node reaches its destination, it will wait for a predefined pause time. Then a new random map node is chosen and it moves toward the map node based on the shortest path. SPMBM model. With those POIs, two nodes will have a better chance to meet if they share some common interests. We assume that every node will be given some context information based on their interests. Then, combining with social and QoS trust, every node will select some neighbors to forward its packets. The simulation scenario is shown in Fig. 7 .
To analyze the scheme performance, we focus on the delivery ratio to the destination and the number of transmitted messages. The parameters used in the simulations are summarized in Table 3 . 
Protection against attack
In this section, we will evaluate our scheme against faked data attack and selfish attack.
A. Against the faked data attack
In our simulations, malicious nodes send faked content to a randomly normal node. To investigate the degree of protection against the faked data attack, we compare the delivery ratio of faked and authentic packets. In Fig. 8 , the lines 'faked content without trust' and 'faked content with trust' represent the delivery ratio of faked content in a context-based routing [5] and in our model, respectively. And the line 'authentic content with trust' represents the delivery ratio of authentic content. Figure 8 shows that the delivery ratio of faked content decreases sharply in our trust model. In our model, the creditable feedback of digital content Fed i j is one social trust metric. Once a normal node receives the faked content, it will give a low feedback toward the evaluated node without forwarding and refusing to receive any content from the same evaluated node. Furthermore, other nodes can also distinguish the malicious nodes by using the trust recommendation and mobile firewall mechanisms. In contrast, the delivery ratio of authentic content remains relatively flat. The slight drop is caused by the non-cooperation of the increasing number of malicious nodes. Similarly, the delivery ratio of faked content is flat, implying the necessity to implement a trust model.
B. Against the selfish node attack
We combine social trust and QoS trust metrics to evaluate every node's trust degree. We are able to mitigate selfish behaviors by the probability of successful interaction and malicious behaviors by the feedback of digital content. As an illustration, we present a simple wireless network of eight nodes, among which n 3 and n 7 are selfish in Fig. 9 .
The trust values perceived by n 4 and n 6 are shown in Fig. 10 . We can see that the trust values of n 3 and n 7 are much lower. The normal nodes and selfish nodes can be distinguished obviously.
Selection of message forwarding rate, λ
In our trust model, only the more trusted neighbors are chosen to forward digital contents. We define λ as a selection rate. A larger λ leads to more message transmission, but higher chance of reaching content destination quickly.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 11 . As λ increases, the message overhead decreases first and then increases. When λ is a small value, the messages are only forwarded to a few nodes, resulting in a lower probability to reach the destination. As λ increases, more nodes are recruited to forward packets. The number of message copies with λ = 1 is twice as much as the minimum value with λ = 0.4. During the rest simulations, we will use λ = 0.4.
Social trust and QoS trust ratio, w social /w qos
In this section, we evaluate the ratio between social trust and QoS trust, w social /w qos . Here, we consider a network with 250 normal nodes and 30 selfish nodes. The results are shown in Fig. 12 .
Social trust contains the probability of successful interactions and the credible feedback of digital content. When the weight of social trust increases, we can select more credible nodes. QoS trust is used to evaluate the capability of a node to deliver messages. The simulation results show that more packets are likely to reach the destination if w qos is increased. According to the results in Fig. 12 , the delivery ratio arrives at A Trust Routing for Multimedia Social Networks 9 the maximum with w social /w qos = 6 4 . Thus, we will choose the ratio 6 4 for the rest of simulations.
Impact of selfish nodes
In this section, we analyze the impact of selfish nodes from two aspects: the average hop count and the number of packets dropped. The lower average hop represents that we can send messages successfully with fewer hops. The number of packets dropped shows the impact of selfish nodes. Figure 13 shows the average hop count increases linearly with the selfish nodes. Compared with the protocol [5] , Fig. 13 shows that our scheme can achieve the same performance with lower packet overhead.
Impact on average hop count
In Fig. 14 , we compare the overhead performance. Overhead is defined as the number of propagated copies for each message. From Fig. 14 , we can observe that the overhead of our scheme is less than half of the context-based scheme, which operates without trust. In our trust model, we combine social trust and QoS trust metrics to select next nodes instead of forwarding messages based only on profile information. Furthermore, our scheme can avoid sending messages to selfish nodes by distinguishing selfish and normal nodes. With a fixed λ, our scheme experiences similar overhead even as the selfish node ratio increases. Figure 15 shows the impact of selfish nodes in terms of packet drop rate, which is defined as the number of packets dropped during one message delivery. The packet drop rate in [5] increases with the selfish nodes. When selfish nodes reach 45%, the packet drop rate approximately reaches 100%. Comparatively, the increasing selfish nodes does not have any effect on the packet drop rate in our scheme.
Impact on packet drop rate
Protocol comparison
Lastly, we compare our scheme with three state-of-the-art schemes. These are trust-based framework (T-PROPHET) in [2] , non-trust-based epidemic (Epidemic) [3] and contextbased routing (Context-based) [5] . In T-PROPHET, the positive feedback serves as the evidence of the forwarding behavior of a node. In the epidemic routing scheme, message carriers forward messages to every new encounter. In the context-based routing scheme, message carriers forward messages to the new encounter only when the latter shares some context information with the destination. We compare these protocols from message delivery ratio and balance between delivery ratio and overhead.
Comparisons on message delivery ratio are in Fig. 16 . We can see that our protocol and T-PROPHET have less performance degradation than epidemic routing and contextbased routing. The reason is that trust models can prevent selfish nodes from receiving messages. Furthermore, the delivery ratio performance in our model is better than T-PROPHET because multimetrics are used. As to the balance between delivery ratio and overhead, we define it as follows:
Larger η means that the delivery ratio can get a higher value with the same overheard cost. As shown in Fig. 17 , the results demonstrate that our trust routing can effectively balance the message overhead and delivery ratio.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we classify routing protocols into four categories: epidemic routing [3] , context-based routing [5] , traditional routing [22, 23] and opportunistic routing [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Epidemic routing [3] relies on flooding the network by sending messages during each encounter. It can guarantee that all messages will be delivered to the destination, if a path exists between source and destination. However, it is wasteful for sending large numbers of redundant messages. Many other attempts have been proposed. For instance, the Probabilistic Routing Protocol [29] uses history of encounters and transitivity to define a probabilistic metric. Then the selection of the best neighbors is based on how frequently they meet each other.
Context-based is proposed to make the routing decision depending on the social connection among nodes. Context information can cover different metrics, depending on different routing protocols [15, [30] [31] [32] [33] .
In [5] , authors focus on the confidentiality and privacy issue. They introduce an original design of a context-based routing protocol. For every node, there are three attributes: mail, workplace and status. End-to-End confidentiality is provided through an extension of identity-based encryption and public encryption with keyword search.
In [31] , a BUBBLE protocol is proposed. They exploit two social metrics, namely centrality and community, to make forwarding decisions. In [15] , a mobility model based on social network theory is proposed. CAR is proposed in [32] to provide the asynchronous communication in partially connected mobile ad hoc networks, based on the intelligent placement of messages. In [33] , PROPICMAN is proposed to allow the sender to select forwarders from neighbors such that messages have the highest probability to reach the destination. Three fundamental aspects regarding security, trust and risk are used in [34] . In [1] , authors adopt the binary relation rough method based on the rough set and find the rough relation and potential path between communities in MSNs. In [10] , a social trust framework for aggregating trust in online social networks is proposed to guarantee the safety management of credible social information by using three key factors. In [11] , authors introduce small world characteristics to improve the traditional trust aware recommendation system and to reduce the time complexity. In [12] , based on small world theory, shared character factors are used to identify the trust value of every node.
Traditional routing refers to those routing schemes, which find a route for a given packet according to the routing table. It can be further divided into three classes [35] : Destination distance sequence vector [22] , Ad hoc on-demand distance vector [23] of on-demand driven and hybrid-type routing protocols.
In [7] , watchdog and pathrater mechanism are proposed based on promiscuous mode operation of the nodes. In [8] , RFSTrust, a trust model based on fuzzy recommendation similarity, is proposed to quantify and to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes, which includes five types of fuzzy trust recommendation relationships based on the fuzzy relation theory and a mathematical description for MANETs. In [36] , a CONFIDANT protocol based on the traditional routing DSR is proposed to evaluate each node in the same way of watchdog.
Opportunistic routing is an upcoming routing technique for wireless networks. The key concept behind opportunistic routing is overhearing and cooperation among relaying nodes [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] .
In [2] , authors design a trust-based framework PROPHET to more accurately evaluate an encounter's delivery competency,
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The Computer Journal, 2014 which can be flexibly integrated with a large family of existing data forwarding protocols designed for OppNets. The positive feedback message is proposed as the evidence of the forwarding behavior of a node. In [25] , authors have introduced a framework to analyze the one-hop throughput of geographic opportunistic routing. In [26] , ECONOMY is proposed to utilize overheard packets and to take multiple routes into consideration. In [24] , a CCACK scheme is proposed. CCACK allows nodes to acknowledge network-coded traffic to their upstream nodes in a simple way, oblivious to loss rates and with negligible overhead.
Because a social network is a structure of nodes that are connected [37] with each other via certain types of relations, such as friendship, workplace and hobbies, context-based forwarding [5] is usually used. Using the context as heuristic is interesting for controlling epidemic forwarding. Every node decides to forward a message only if the shared context between itself and the destination is significant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The trust relationship between nodes has a direct impact on the sharing and transmission method of digital content. To efficiently route packets, we have investigated trust model and routing scheme in the MSN environment to guarantee the routing validity and avoid some selfish or malicious nodes. We adopt fuzzy sets to establish a new trust evaluation model based on the multimetrics. Combining direct trust and indirect trust relationship, every node can rank all its neighbors. During the routing decision, the untrustworthy nodes will be ignored. We have analyzed and evaluated our trust routing with the ONE simulator. Security analysis shows that our protocol can meet the security requirements. Simulation results show that our routing protocol possesses several unique properties on delivery probability and traffic overhead.
In future work, we will conduct further studies on the antiattack capacity and incorporate other influencing attributes into the trust model.
